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George Floyd’s Legacy: Reforming, 
Relating, and Rethinking Through 
Chauvin’s Conviction and Appeal Under a 
Felony-Murder Doctrine Long-
Weaponized Against People of Color 
Greg Egan† 
I. Inequity and Evolution: How Police Use of Force and the 
Felony-Murder Doctrine Are Poised to Change on the 
One-Year Anniversary of George Floyd’s Death 
Minnesota’s second-degree felony-murder statute represents a 
unique and creative charging mechanism that affords wide 
discretion to prosecutors. This makes it ripe for inequitable 
application. It is the most serious charge brought against George 
Floyd’s killer, Derek Chauvin.1 Prosecutors can find novel ways to 
charge felony-murder for almost any unintended death, and they 
often use it in cases where they also allege homicidal intent. At the 
same time, it is a charge prosecutors can find plausible justification 
not to bring in most cases. This wide discretion provides leverage to 
prosecutors in plea negotiations. Plea negotiations can work to the 
benefit of defendants who are initially charged with second-degree 
intentional murder by affording them the opportunity to plead down 
to felony-murder, which carries less than half the guideline 
sentence.2 This wide charging discretion also has the potential to 
unfairly elevate crimes that should have been charged as 
manslaughter, third-degree murder, or other lesser offenses. The 
discretion can entail a twenty-fold inflation in sentencing over the 
 
 †. The Author is a veteran felony trial attorney in the office of the Ramsey 
County Public Defender and an adjunct professor at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
He thanks Anne Bolgert, Abbie Maier, and Andrew Selva not only for their tireless 
work as research assistants, but also for their thoughtful analytical insight. The 
author also thanks Sam Brower. 
 1. Complaint at 1, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. 
Ct. 2020). 
 2. Sentencing guidelines provide for 306 months for intentional second-degree 
murder and 150 months for second-degree felony-murder for an offender with no 
criminal history. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4.A (MINNESOTA 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2020). There are recent Minnesota cases 
where even defendants indicted for first-degree premeditated murder were allowed 
to plead all the way down to second-degree felony-murder. See infra Section II.B. 
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charges on which it is commonly predicated.3 For these reasons, the 
charging and disposition of felony-murder cases reveal much about 
racial disparities in the larger criminal justice system. 
The felony-murder doctrine is frequently weaponized against 
people of color, while prosecutors and judges allow White 
defendants to exploit the doctrine to their benefit. Killings by peace 
officers magnify the disparity; officers who should be charged with 
felony-murder instead face reduced charges, or more frequently, no 
charges at all.4 The victim’s and the killer’s race matter, both in 
police killings and in the broader application of the felony-murder 
doctrine. This context allows for an informed assessment of the 
evolution Minnesota and the world have undergone in the year 
since George Floyd’s killing. It also provides a framework for an 
analysis of the inevitable appeal of Chauvin’s convictions and the 
implications this may have on reform or abolition of the felony-
murder doctrine. It situates this prosecution within the affected 
community as it moves forward through reform, growth, and unity. 
Section II of this Article analyzes sentencings, plea 
negotiations, convictions, and charging under Minnesota’s felony-
murder doctrine across race, buttressing statistics with examples 
and exposing racial inequities in the way the felony-murder 
doctrine is deployed. Section III provides a legal analysis of the case 
against Philando Castile’s killer, Jeronimo Yanez. While the world 
applauded the second-degree manslaughter charge against Yanez, 
the case was actually ripe for felony-murder charging. This section 
juxtaposes the Yanez case with a more obscure shooting by a 
defendant of color who was not a peace officer, illustrating that a 
killing by a peace officer can be more egregious, yet not result in 
charges of the level faced by a lay person of color. Section IV exposes 
how Minnesota peace officers who kill have, until now, rarely been 
prosecuted at any level. It provides a brief overview of the only other 
four prosecuted Minnesota police killings in recent memory, 
reconciling these cases with larger trends and accounting for race. 
 
 3. Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.66(1)(a) (2020) (providing for a two-year 
statutory maximum penalty for reckless or unlawful intentional discharge of a 
firearm), with MINN. STAT. § 609.19(2) (2020) (providing for a forty-year statutory 
maximum for second-degree felony-murder). Relative to statutory maximum 
comparisons, the disparities are generally less pronounced when it comes to 
guideline sentences for common predicate felonies. But they are still marked. An 
offender with a criminal history score of zero faces a guideline sentence of twenty-
one months for second-degree assault and 150 months for second-degree felony-
murder. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4.A (MINNESOTA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2020). A guideline sentence for an offender with no 
criminal history who is convicted of unlawful discharge of a firearm is probation. Id. 
 4. See infra Section IV. 
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The section weighs the implications of Chauvin’s appeal of his 
convictions against the broader historical abuses of the felony-
murder doctrine. It analyzes the impact these legal proceedings 
have on public policy and recognizes their symbolic and social 
power, which reframes the hurt, the hope, and the heart of the Twin 
Cities community.5 
II.  The Color of Injustice: Racial Disparities in Charging 
and Disposition of Second-Degree Felony-Murder Cases 
Defendants of color have different outcomes under the felony-
murder doctrine than White defendants. When defendants of color 
are charged with more serious murder counts, they are less likely 
to be afforded the opportunity to plead down to second-degree 
felony-murder.6 Defendants of color are more often convicted of the 
most serious charge when the top count is second-degree felony-
murder.7 They are statistically more likely to be convicted in 
general and are often sentenced more harshly upon conviction.8 
Individual cases across demographics fortify these statistical 
trends, making it clear that the felony-murder doctrine has long 
been weaponized against people of color, while representing a 
relatively lenient alternative for White defendants. 
The statistics relied upon in this Article were drawn from a set 
of all second-degree felony-murder convictions sentenced from 2012 
through 2018 in Ramsey and Hennepin counties, where St. Paul 
and Minneapolis are respectively located.9 The data set includes 
offenders who initially faced lesser or greater charges, so long as the 
conviction was ultimately for second-degree felony-murder. The 
statistical set includes cases that were resolved through guilty pleas 
as well as trial convictions. The data include the length of sentences, 
alongside the guideline sentences. Offender age, gender, and race 
are also included. This data set reveals much about the deployment, 
effect, and backdrop of Minnesota’s felony-murder rule in 
perpetuating racial inequities. 
 
 5. The Twin Cities is a colloquialism referring to the greater Minneapolis and 
Saint Paul metropolitan region, generally. For the purposes of this Article, Twin 
Cities refers to Ramsey and Hennepin counties where the data was gathered from. 
 6. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER, 
§ 609.19, SUBD. 2(1): SENTENCED 2012–2018 (2020) (on file with author). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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A. Racially Disparate Sentencings 
Sentencing statistics across race expose disparities in the 
application of the felony-murder doctrine. White defendants 
sentenced to second-degree felony-murder in Ramsey and Hennepin 
counties from 2012 to 2018 were two-and-a-half times more likely 
to receive a shorter-than-guideline sentence relative to a longer-
than-guideline sentence.10 Meanwhile, defendants of color received 
mitigated and aggravated sentencing departures at roughly the 
same rate.11 Judges gave reduced sentences to White defendants 25 
percent of the time, compared to 16 percent for defendants of color.12 
One White defendant was sentenced to a mere five years for his 
involvement in a drug deal where the victim was shot to death.13 
While the defendant did not fire the fatal shots, he was also 
armed.14 
This disparity is also manifested by cases involving White 
defendants committing egregious crimes but receiving guideline 
sentences, instead of the aggravated sentences that similarly-
situated defendants of color frequently receive. Even after hearing 
all the gruesome evidence during a jury trial of a White defendant 
who tortured his girlfriend to death, a sentencing judge ordered a 
guideline range sentence.15 The defendant had beaten the victim 
over her entire body.16 There were scrapes and scratches on her 
arms and knees, likely from her attempt to crawl away.17 The 
defendant fractured her neck before ultimately choking her to 
death.18 He admitted to choking her the night before as well. 19 If 
ever a case warranted an aggravated sentencing departure, this one 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Felony Criminal Complaint at 2–4, State v. Sjostrand, No. 62-CR-18-219 
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2012). 
 14. Id. at 2–3. 
 15. Felony Criminal Complaint at 2, State v. Manney, No. 27-CR-11-16860 
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2012). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Like the trial judge, who exercised relative leniency at sentencing, 
prosecutors were lenient to this White defendant by declining to seek an indictment 
under the domestic abuse provision of the first-degree murder statute. MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.185(a)(6) (2010) (providing for culpability when an actor “causes the death of a 
human being while committing domestic abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged 
in a past pattern of domestic abuse . . . and the death occurs under circumstances 
manifesting an extreme indifference to human life”). 
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did. However, the White defendant was given a guideline-range 
sentence.20 
Even when an aggravated sentence is arguably warranted for 
a defendant of color,21 it can still be disproportionately harsh and 
glaringly out of sync with what similarly-situated White defendants 
receive. An Asian defendant received a sentence double the 
presumptive sentence for killing a child in his care.22 Sentencing 
guideline ranges suggest that he had a criminal history score of 
zero.23 Meanwhile, a White woman who suffocated her infant to 
death before almost killing a second child the same way received a 
sentence of barely half of what the sentencing guidelines 
prescribed.24 There should be parity in sentencing across race under 
the felony-murder statute, but there is not. 
B. Plea Negotiations and Convictions Across Race 
On their surface, the racial demographics of second-degree 
felony-murder convictions in the Twin Cities support the claim of 
widespread racial disparity. Minnesota’s population is 
approximately 83.8 percent White.25 A higher concentration of 
people of color reside in the St. Paul/Minneapolis metro area,26 
which is 77.1 percent White.27 Second-degree felony-murder 
conviction statistics do not mirror this demographic data. Between 
2012 and 2018, defendants of color accounted for 80.2 percent of 
felony-murder convictions, while White defendants accounted for 
just 19.8 percent.28 Normalized for demographics, people of color in 
 
 20. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER, 
supra note 6. 
 21. See e.g., Felony Criminal Complaint at 2–3, State v. Meak, No. 62-CR-15-
1070 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2012). The defendant was alleged to have “rough 
housed” a child; semen was found on the child. Id. 
 22. Id.; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4 (MINNESOTA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2011). 
 23. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID § 4 (MINNESOTA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2011). 
 24. Complaint at 2, State v. Casey, No. 27-CR-13-22282 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 
2013); MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER, 
supra note 6. 
 25. Quick Facts Minnesota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ 
quickfacts/MN [perma.cc/9FXV-D3H2]. 
 26. MINNESOTA STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION, AGE, RACE, & ETHNICITY (2018), https://mn.gov/admin/ 
demography/data-by-topic/age-race-ethnicity/ [perma.cc/6H2L-GUYN]. 
 27. Race and Ethnicity in the Minneapolis Area (Metro Area), CEDAR LAKE 
VENTURES, INC. (Sept. 14, 2018) (citing U.S. Census data), https://statistical 
atlas.com/metro-area/Minnesota/Minneapolis/Race-and-Ethnicity [perma.cc/7Z53-
9F8N]. 
 28. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER, 
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the Twin Cities are statistically twelve times more likely to be 
convicted of second-degree felony-murder.29 
More troubling than the racial distribution of second-degree 
felony-murder convictions is the disparity in what the convictions 
reflect in the shadow of the original charges. The overwhelming 
majority of convictions are the result of plea negotiations.30 Indeed, 
negotiated plea deals have become the vehicle by which most 
criminal cases are resolved around the country.31 66.7 percent of the 
White defendants convicted of second-degree felony-murder in 
Minnesota were initially charged or indicted with more serious 
levels of homicide.32 For White defendants, a guilty plea to second-
degree felony-murder most often represents generous resolution 
relative to the exposure under the original complaint or indictment. 
White defendants in the Twin Cities routinely benefit by pleading 
down to second-degree felony-murder. 
Conviction statistics under the second-degree felony-murder 
doctrine present the opposite trend for defendants of color. 
Defendants of color sentenced to second-degree felony-murder had 
their charges reduced in only 38.5 percent of cases.33 For the rest of 
the defendants of color, their second-degree felony-murder 
conviction represented the most serious count.34 The plea 
bargaining statistics reveal a striking racial disparity: White 
defendants plead to reduced felony-murder charges at nearly double 
the rate of defendants of color. 
Inequities run deeper than statistically tilted plea 
negotiations. The facts of individual cases, as alleged in the criminal 
complaints, best illustrate two parallel yet unenviable trends. 
White defendants are frequently punished leniently, while 
defendants of color receive harsher treatment even when the facts 
support opposite outcomes. 
 
supra note 6. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. INNOCENCE PROJECT, REPORT: GUILTY PLEAS ON THE RISE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 
ON THE DECLINE (Aug. 7, 2018), https://innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-on-the-rise-
criminal-trials-on-the-decline/ [perma.cc/9TSN-B7QH]; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. 




 32. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER, 
supra note 6. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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A robbery involving six codefendants that left a young man 
dead illustrates this disturbing trend. Two of the codefendants were 
Black, and four were White.35 While all six were initially indicted 
for first-degree murder,36 the four White codefendants were 
permitted to plead guilty to a reduced charge under the inherently 
pliable second-degree felony-murder rule.37 The Black defendant 
who fired the gun pled to second-degree intentional murder.38 While 
the Black codefendant who did not fire the gun pled guilty to second-
degree felony-murder, he received a harsher-than-guideline 
sentence.39 The White codefendants all received sentences within 
guideline sentence range for second-degree felony-murder.40 None 
of the four White codefendants received consecutive sentences; both 
of the Black codefendants did.41 
According to the complaint and newspaper coverage of the 
incident, five of the codefendants hatched a detailed plan to break 
into their drug dealer’s apartment to steal drugs and take back a 
gaming system.42 Newspaper coverage reported that at least part of 
the group was intent on “beating the [expletive] out of [the drug 
dealer] then taking everything.”43 The same source recounted an 
agreement to split what they burglarized, “since it’s a group deal.”44 
The sixth codefendant was reportedly recruited to bring a gun; he 
“made sure it was loaded.”45 As a car waited outside, four of the 
codefendants burst into the apartment, according to the criminal 
complaint.46 Some reportedly ransacked it searching for drugs, 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Brandon Stahl, Suburban Women Plead Guilty to Murder for Their Role in 
Drug Robbery-Turned Slaying, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.star 
tribune.com/suburban-women-plead-guilty-to-murder-for-their-role-in-drug-
robbery-turned-slaying/470561553/ [perma.cc/3E24-VC8B]. 
 37. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER, 
supra note 6. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. While he pled down to second-degree unintentional felony-murder like 
the White codefendants, his sentence was 24 percent higher than prescribed in the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Id.; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID 
§ 4.A (MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION 2017). 
 40. Id.; MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE 
MURDER, supra note 6. 
 41. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER, 
supra note 6. 
 42. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. 
Ct. 2018). 
 43. Stahl, supra note 36. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.; Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. 
Dist. Ct. 2018). 
 46. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. 
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yelling and swearing at the victim, while others attacked the 
decedent and “pistol whipped” him.47 The complaint further 
recounts that they forced the decedent’s girlfriend onto a bed, 
pointed the gun at her head, and told her they would kill her if she 
left the bedroom.48 She described holding the decedent as “he took 
his last breath.”49 The decedent was shot in the neck; the bullet 
grazed his jugular vein, shattered his spine, and fractured his 
skull.50 Prosecutors also noted blunt force trauma to his head and 
face.51 The codefendants reportedly left him there and fled with the 
drugs.52 
Although it may be argued that lesser charges are warranted 
because the White codefendants did not actually pull the trigger,53 
it is a well-established tenet of Minnesota criminal law that 
accomplices are liable for the conduct of the principal at the same 
level.54 Even so, the disparity in sentencing under the same 
statutory subsection remains: the Black codefendant who did not 
pull the trigger received a significantly harsher sentence than the 
 
Ct. 2018). 
 47. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. 
Ct. 2018). 
 48. Stahl, supra note 36. 
 49. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. 
Ct. 2018); David Chanen, Mother of Slain Teen Laments A Wasted Life Over Drugs, 
Mistakes, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.startribune.com/mother-of-slain-
teen-laments-a-wasted-life-over-drugs-mistakes/479024163/ [perma.cc/4XD3-6ZTX]. 
 50. Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. 
Ct. 2018). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Admittedly, some legal scholars have taken issue with this tenet, arguing 
that an accomplice should not bear full liability for the actions of the principal actor. 
See Michael Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just Proportion: The Peculiar Law of 
Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 129 (2013); Sherif Girgis, The Mens Rea 
of Accomplice Liability: Supporting Intentions, 123 YALE L.J. 266 (2013); Joshua 
Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New 
Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985). 
 54. State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Minn. 2020) (citing MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.05(1) (2018)); State v. Whitman, 114 N.W. 363, 364 (Minn. 1908). It is notable 
that in at least one U.S. jurisdiction, “[f]or all intents and purposes the ‘second-
degree felony-murder’ rule for accomplices has been abolished.” CAL. STATE SENATE, 
FACT SHEET FOR SENATE BILL 1437 (2018); see also People v. Cruz, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
166, 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (citing CAL. STAT. ch. 1015, § 1 (2018) (explaining that 
“to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual 
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the 
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life”). If Minnesota 
had a similar limitation, the five codefendants who did not fire the fatal shot may 
not have been convicted of second-degree felony-murder. Other states align with 
Minnesota in holding accomplices fully liable under the felony-murder doctrine. See, 
e.g., State v. Chambers, 515 N.W.2d 531, 533 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Blair, 
228 P.3d 564, 568 (Ore. 2010); State v. Rios, 172 P.3d 844, 846 (Ariz. 2007). 
2021] George Floyd’s Legacy 551 
four similarly-situated White codefendants. The felony-murder rule 
should not be contorted to reach inequitable outcomes. 
While advocates for the White codefendants may argue that 
they were actually treated too harshly, in reality, they reaped the 
benefit of the second-degree felony murder rule, considering that 
the facts could have yielded a conviction under a far more serious 
variant of the doctrine. Under Minnesota law, both the first and 
second-degree murder statutes have a provision for felony-
murder.55 Burglary is among the predicate felonies specifically 
enumerated in the first-degree felony-murder statute.56 Ample facts 
alleged in the complaints would support this predicate offense.57 Yet 
prosecutors were content with a conviction under the lesser second-
degree felony-murder provision. Their decision transformed 
potential first-degree felony-murder life sentences into second-
degree felony-murder sentences as short as twelve and a half 
years.58 
While the author does not contend that life sentences would be 
just in this case, an analytical juxtaposition of the second-degree 
and first-degree felony-murder rules illustrates the wide-ranging 
homicidal liability that exists on strikingly similar facts. Such 
discretion perpetuates further inequity in plea negotiations, trials, 
and sentencings, leaving a system ripe for abuse and incapable of 
delivering racial equity. This example exposes the reasons that both 
first-degree and second-degree felony-murder should be excised 
from Minnesota’s statutory and common law schemes. Doing so will 
leave a set of thoughtfully-tiered laws, accounting for all levels of 
homicidal and less-than-homicidal liability,59 and it will create a 
construct under which these six codefendants, Black and White, 
could have been equitably charged or indicted, negotiated with, 
tried, and sentenced. 
 
 55. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(3) (2016); MINN. STAT. § 609.19(2)(1) (2016). 
 56. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(3) (2016). The Supreme Court of Minnesota 
recognizes first-degree felony-murder prosecutions predicated on burglary. See, e.g., 
State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Minn. 2014). 
 57. See Complaint at 3, State v. Peterson, No. 27-CR-17-10674 (Hennepin Cnty. 
Dist. Ct. 2018) (alleging on its face burglary while possessing a firearm as the 
predicate felony). 
 58. MINN. STAT. § 609.19(1)(1) (2016); MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER, supra note 6. 
 59. Absent the felony-murder doctrine, the Minnesota Legislature has erected a 
thoughtful, effective, and wide-ranging statutory scheme that aptly addresses all 
unjustified killings, ranging from second-degree manslaughter, MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.205(1) (2020) to third degree murder, MINN. STAT. § 609.195(a) (2020), to 
second-degree intentional murder, MINN. STAT. § 609.19(1)(1) (2020), to first-degree 
murder, MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(1) (2020). 
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While it is easy to criticize prosecutors who apply the felony-
murder doctrine in racially inequitable ways, one should not 
overlook that it is the theoretical underpinnings of Minnesota’s 
felony-murder doctrines that enable them to do so. Minnesota’s 
statutory schemes provide the architecture for convictions under 
statutory provisions with guideline sentences ranging from just 
over ten years to life in prison for essentially the same conduct. Both 
the theory and application of Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrines 
must be repaired or repealed if the disparities cannot be reconciled. 
As the law stands now, felony-murder makes for faux plea 
negotiations, and as exemplified below, unjust charging. These are 
the byproducts of the unconscionably wide prosecutorial discretion 
inherent in the doctrine. 
C. Charging Discretion Ripe for Abuse 
White defendants frequently benefit from the felony-murder 
doctrine, while defendants of color have a markedly different 
experience. Just as this disparity is painfully apparent in plea 
negotiations and conviction trends, it also manifests in charging 
decisions. Even when prosecutors ultimately amend their charges, 
initial charging decisions reveal further racial inequity. These 
decisions inarguably impact the course of individual prosecutions, 
even when cases gravitate away from the initial charges. It is the 
stunningly wide discretion inherent in Minnesota’s felony-murder 
doctrine, in the abstract, that sustains racially inequitable charging 
practices. 
Defendants of color may face aggressive felony-murder 
charges for facts that should not warrant murder prosecutions at 
all. According to a criminal complaint and newspaper reports, a 
Black Minneapolis man had a dispute with his brother.60 Isolated 
in the basement, the victim shot the defendant.61 Witnesses say 
they heard three shots, and the defendant shouted out, “my brother 
just shot me.”62 It was only then that the defendant returned fire.63 
His defensive gunshots killed his brother only after the defendant 
himself received multiple gunshot wounds.64 
In their criminal complaint, prosecutors strained to justify 
their second-degree felony-murder charge by noting that the 
 
 60. Complaint at 3, State v. Clark, No. 27-CR-18-4772 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct. 
2018). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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victim’s firearm was only “a small gun,”65 as if to imply that the 
bullets fired from it did not have lethal potential. It is also 
noteworthy that prosecutors acknowledged that it was the victim 
who pursued the defendant into the basement, where, cornered, 
they exchanged gunfire.66 Self-defense would have negated the 
second-degree assault on which the felony-murder charge was 
predicated.67 Legal scholars have advanced compelling arguments 
as to why most assaults should not be viable predicate felonies; most 
states have adapted their laws accordingly.68 Charging prosecutors 
were almost certainly aware of this fracture in the legal and 
academic communities. But that did not prevent them from 
bringing murder charges against this Black defendant. 
The felony-murder charge was not, however, enough for 
prosecutors: they went a step further by also bringing the grossly 
inflated charge of second-degree intentional murder.69 The result 
was a leveraging of plea negotiations to extract a plea to what 
appears a lesser count of second-degree felony-murder. This 
prosecutorial tool creates an artificial middle count used to extort 
guilty pleas from people of color who are actually liable of lesser 
crimes, or no crime at all. 
Stretching the second-degree felony-murder doctrine to charge 
and convict this Black defendant is not an isolated occurrence. 
Another Black man left to care for his girlfriend’s infant children 
was convicted of second-degree felony-murder, primarily for failing 
to seek medical care for an infant’s burned wrist and instead giving 
him too much over-the-counter medicine, which doctors opined may 
have had an unintended sedative effect.70 In attending to the child, 
the defendant had wrapped the child’s wrist,71 which likely would 
have made it difficult to assess the severity of the burn. This should 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. MINN. STAT. § 609.065 (2006) (characterizing “justifiable taking of life” as 
occurring “when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the actor 
reasonably believes exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death”).  
 68. Greg Egan, Collateral and Independent Felonious Design: A Call to Adopt a 
Tempered Merger Limitation for Predicate Felonies of Assault Under a Minnesota 
Felony-Murder Doctrine Currently ‘Too Productive of Injustice’, 44 MITCHELL 
HAMLINE L. REV., no. 5, 2018, at 98 (advocating adoption of a merger limitation to 
Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine, which would make most assaults inviable as 
predicate felonies). 
 69. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER, 
supra note 6. 
 70. Complaint at 2–3, State v. Todd, No. 27-CR-12-17771 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. 
Ct. 2012). 
 71. Id. at 2. 
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have been significant to charging attorneys, because the specific 
cause of death was a blood infection from the burn.72 
There were injuries consistent with child abuse, which 
prosecutors implicitly speculated the defendant had caused.73 But 
they also acknowledged that more than a dozen other people resided 
in a home containing rotting food, dead animals, and overall filthy 
conditions.74 The complaint further acknowledged a potential 
accidental fall down the stairs,75 but prosecutors refused to concede 
that this could have accounted for some of the injuries noted in the 
autopsy. Regardless of the source or intentionality of the injuries, 
the cause of death was listed as “complications from neglect.”76 
In assessing the fairness of attributing fatal neglect to the 
defendant, prosecutors should have considered several factors. The 
defendant, who was twenty years old, was the only one in the house 
who took any responsibility for caring for the children under 
intensely challenging circumstances.77 He described having to feed 
the children nonperishable food and being relegated to a small room 
in the basement.78 The defendant’s mother was upset at him for 
having the children in the house, but that did not stop her from 
leaving additional young children in his care when she too left the 
home for an unspecified amount of time.79 The defendant had made 
scores of phone calls to the children’s mother; she ignored them all, 
so he did not know if or when she would return.80 Furthermore, 
when she finally returned, she was with the children during the 
hours immediately before it became known that the infant was 
dead; the infant did not die while in the defendant’s care.81 
Rather than focusing on those facts, the charging prosecutor 
focused on the allegation that the defendant left the children 
sleeping in a crib for an hour before their mother finally returned 
so he could go to the store—likely to buy food for the children.82 
Prosecutors make no mention of which, or how many, adults were 
in the house for the hour during which he did not, allegedly, 
 
 72. Id. at 3. 
 73. Id. at 3–4. 
 74. Id. at 2. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 3. 
 77. Id. 1–2. 
 78. Id. at 2. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 3. 
 82. Id. 
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“arrange for supervision.”83 A second-degree felony-murder 
conviction for this young Black defendant represents a miscarriage 
of justice, and it stands in stark contrast to the manner in which 
the doctrine is generally employed in cases charged against White 
defendants. 
Even when later amended, initial charging decisions often 
reflect deference to White defendants ultimately convicted of 
second-degree felony-murder. Two men were shot to death at a St. 
Paul motel because one of them allegedly owed a codefendant 
$1,000.84 The White defendant drove the killer to the hotel, knocked 
on the door, then helped force entry.85 He watched as several shots 
were fired, then the victims bled to death in the parking lot and on 
a nearby roadway.86 After the defendant fled in his car, he later 
picked up the shooter and other codefendant and drove them 
further away from the scene while they plotted their stories to avoid 
incriminating one another.87 Police found the two lifeless bodies and 
quickly apprehended the defendant.88 Yet prosecutors effectively 
ignored both deaths when making their initial charging decision: 
they charged the White defendant only with aiding and abetting 
attempted first-degree aggravated robbery and aiding and abetting 
attempted simple robbery.89 These offenses carry statutory 
maximum sentences of just ten and five years, respectively.90 
Prosecutors failed to charge second-degree felony-murder 
initially.91 The Black codefendant who was not the gunman in this 
case was sentenced to the statutory maximum: forty years in 
prison.92 The White codefendant was sentenced to just over twelve 
 
 83. Id. at 1–4. 
 84. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Benner, No. 62-CR-16-2156 
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2016). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 4. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1–2. 
 90. MINN. STAT. § 609.245(1) (2014); MINN. STAT. § 609.24 (2014). 
 91. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, State v. Benner, No. 62-CR-16-2156 
(Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2016). 
Defendants of color are routinely charged with felony-murder from the onset of 
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See, e.g., Complaint at 3, State v. Smith, No. 27-CR-14-1327 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. 
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62-CR-16-6906 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2016); Complaint at 2–3, State v. Foresta, 
No. 27-CR-13-25524 (Hennepin Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2014); Complaint at 3, State v. 
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 92. MINN. STAT. § 609.19(1) (2014). Sarah Horner, He Didn’t Pull the Trigger, 
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years.93 The initial decisions impact trial preparation, 
investigations, plea negotiations, and sentencings—further 
propelling racial inequities. 
The Twin Cites has an unadmirable history in the disposition 
of second-degree felony-murder cases. The record is ripe with 
disheartening examples of White defendants benefiting from the 
felony-murder doctrine, while defendants of color receive draconian 
treatment. The racial inequities manifest in charging, plea 
negotiations, conviction levels, and sentencings. Nearly a decade of 
statistics support these findings. In the abstract, the felony-murder 
doctrine is strained, artificial, and unfair. The archaic doctrine’s 
application magnifies its flaws. The felony-murder doctrine 
exacerbates racial inequities and should be overhauled or 
altogether abolished. 
III. Culpable Negligence or Reckless Intent: A Case Study 
in the Charging of a Peace Officer and an Indigent Man 
of Color 
A police shooting and a shooting by an indigent person of color 
occurred in recent years in Ramsey County; though similar in 
factual consequence, they quickly took on very different legal 
complexions. In 2016, after months of deliberation, Ramsey County 
prosecutors made a charging decision in a high-profile police 
shooting. 94 The victim was a Black school cafeteria worker, 
Philando Castile.95 The defendant was a veteran of the St. Anthony 
Police Department, Jeronimo Yanez.96 Castile had been driving 
 
But He Gets 40 Years, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.twin 
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 93. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2ND DEGREE MURDER, 
supra note 6. 
 94. See generally John Choi, Ramsey Cnty. Att’y, Remarks Regarding the Hiring 
of a Special Prosecutor to Assist in the Philando Castile Matter (July 29, 2016), 
https://www.ramseycounty.us/sites/default/files/County%20Attorney/County%20Att
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Ramsey County Attorney, Ramsey County Attorney Announces Criminal Charges 
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16, 2016), https://www.ramseycounty.us/sites/default/files/County%20Attorney/ 
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Complaint at 7, State v. Yanez, No. 0620373879 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2017). 
 95. Mitch Smith, Officer Cleared in 2016 Killing of Black Driver, N.Y. TIMES at 
A1 (June 16, 2017). 
 96. Id. 
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with his girlfriend and her young daughter when Yanez pulled the 
car over for a broken brake light.97 Castile “calmly” told the officer 
that he had a firearm; he also had a valid permit to carry.98 Yanez 
suddenly fired seven times into the car, killing Castile and nearly 
striking his girlfriend and the child.99 Prosecutors charged Yanez 
with second-degree manslaughter and intentional discharge of a 
firearm that endangers safety.100 
The same office charged a more obscure case nearly a decade 
earlier against a nineteen-year-old Mexican immigrant, Alfredo 
“Freddy” Gutierrez-Gonzales, who was mishandling a rifle on the 
front porch of a house.101 When Gutierrez-Gonzales heard someone 
approaching, he put the rifle down.102 His friend called out, “Don’t 
trip, it’s just me.”103 As Gutierrez-Gonzales picked the rifle back up, 
it suddenly went off.104 The bullet struck his friend, who was White, 
in the head; he died at the scene.105 Prosecutors did not dispute that 
the rifle going off was anything other than a tragic accident.106 
Within days, prosecutors charged Gutierrez-Gonzales with second-
degree felony-murder.107 The peace officer and the young man of 
color faced markedly different consequences. 
The felony-murder charge in the Gutierrez-Gonzales case 
rested on a legally unstable foundation. The criminal complaint 
clearly enumerated the predicate felony: reckless discharge of a 
firearm within a municipality.108 Unlike most other viable predicate 
felonies, which require intentional or knowing levels of mens rea to 
trigger felony-murder prosecutions,109 the predicate felony in the 
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 100. Felony Criminal Complaint at 7, State v. Yanez, No. 0620373879 (Ramsey 
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case against Gutierrez-Gonzales required only reckless mens rea.110 
Although under Minnesota common law, offenses with reckless 
mens rea—or even strict liability—are technically viable predicate 
felonies,111 this charging vehicle stretches the theoretical 
framework of the felony-murder doctrine, which is premised on 
imputed intent, and has come under harsh criticism.112 
In State v. Engle, decided just months before Gutierrez-
Gonzales was charged, the Supreme Court of Minnesota assessed 
the mens rea requirement for reckless discharge of a firearm within 
a municipality as a standalone offense.113 The Engle Court noted 
ambiguity in whether the reckless mens rea required the voluntary 
act of pulling the trigger, or merely any voluntary act that 
“increases the likelihood that the gun will discharge 
accidentally.”114 The Engle Court concluded that any “conscious or 
intentional act in connection with the discharge of a firearm” 
satisfies the mens rea element.115 
 
a mens rea requirement of “intentionally” for the predicate felony of arson); State v. 
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 114. Id. at 595–96 (Minn. 2008) (cited in State v. Coleman, 944 N.W.2d 469, 478 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2020) (defining reckless mens rea but applying it to third-degree 
murder)). 
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the defendant in Engle, a private security guard, was acting in a quasi-law 
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Arguably, the law just months before Gutierrez-Gonzales was 
charged required a deliberate, volitional trigger pull.116 The 
complaint did not allege one.117 Still, prosecutors rushed to charge 
Gutierrez-Gonzales with felony-murder. More unnerving, 
prosecutors made no attempt to satisfy even the lower post-Engle 
mens rea threshold. They failed to plead any voluntary acts by 
Gutierrez-Gonzales that would have “increase[d] the likelihood that 
the gun will discharge accidentally.”118 The only facts alleged in the 
complaint relating to Gutierrez-Gonzales’ handling the rifle are 
“trying to put a clip in” and “pick[ing] the gun back up” after 
“put[ting] the gun down.”119 This is routine conduct that peace 
officers across the nation engage in every day without criticism; yet 
it is the sole alleged misconduct on which Gutierrez-Gonzales’ 
felony-murder charge hinged. 
The same office declined to utilize a similar predicate felony 
against Yanez. Prosecutors had to have realized that such a 
charging option was available; the potential predicate felony was 
evident as counts two and three on the very face of the complaint: 
intentional discharge of a firearm that endangers safety.120 The 
mens rea for the would-be predicate felony was intentional.121 If 
reckless discharge of a firearm could predicate felony-murder 
charges in the case against Gutierrez-Gonzales, certainly 
intentional discharge of a firearm could serve as a predicate felony 
in the case against Yanez. Intentional discharge of a firearm is a 
more legally sound predicate felony because of its heightened mens 
rea requirement. Charging second-degree felony-murder would 
have recalibrated plea negotiations, trial strategy, and the way 
jurors viewed the evidence. It may have even led to a guilty plea or 
a different verdict at trial. 
The facts only bolster the case for a felony-murder charge 
against Yanez. He deliberately aimed his firearm in the direction of 
Castile and the other two occupants of the vehicle, and with full 
volitional control, pulled the trigger no less than seven times.122 
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Obviously, prosecutors thought they had a strong case for unlawful 
intentional discharge of a firearm, otherwise they would not have 
charged Yanez with those two counts. But they failed to take the 
next step and bring the felony-murder charge, even though the only 
additional element of proof they would have needed was not in 
dispute: Philando Castile’s lifeless body. 
The Yanez prosecutors may argue that it was a legitimate 
exercise of discretion not to charge felony-murder. That discretion 
is precisely the problem: it so rarely gets used to the detriment of 
peace officers and is so often weaponized against people of color.123 
Regardless of whether it was Yanez’s status as a peace officer or the 
race of the victims that differentiated the charging in the two cases, 
this disparity exemplifies unconscionable systemic bias in the 
prosecution of police killings and killings by civilian people of color. 
If prosecutors cannot harmonize their charging decisions across 
these demographics, the felony-murder doctrine should be 
abolished. 
IV. George Floyd’s Legacy: Lasting Reform and a Shifting 
Social Prism in Anticipation of Appellate Review of 
Minnesota’s Felony-Murder Doctrine 
The distorted approach to police killings, coupled with larger 
systemic racial bias, has plagued the Twin Cities’ handling of 
felony-murder cases, other homicides, and crime more generally. In 
the four years between the Castile and Floyd killings, Minnesota 
prosecutors brought charges against peace officers on just two other 
occasions.124 In that time there were forty-seven on-duty police 
killings in the state.125 The problem goes back much further: from 
2000–2016, the Office of the Hennepin County Attorney did not 
bring charges in a single police shooting.126 The racial inequity of 
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that approach and the tacit acceptance of the devastation, 
dehumanization, and terror it encompasses have deeply scarred the 
community. The Chauvin conviction and appellate posture may 
cultivate justice in two conflicting ways: either upholding a measure 
of accountability against Floyd’s killer in a way that catalyzes 
community healing, or, alternatively, prompting a legal change in a 
way that would, unfortunately, lessen this killer’s punishment but 
facilitate new law benefiting the long-abused community he has so 
deeply scarred. 
The prosecution of George Floyd’s killer stands apart from 
even the other exceedingly rare cases charged against peace 
officers. It is a sign of progress, but it also evidences just how far 
things had deteriorated. The other recent Minnesota police killings, 
while driven in part by their unique factual circumstances, still 
mirror the racial inequities evident in second-degree felony-murder 
prosecutions more generally. They also reflect a basic deference to 
peace officers. A Washington County Sheriff’s deputy, Brian Krook, 
was recently indicted for second-degree manslaughter for shooting 
a young man in the midst of a mental health crisis.127 The victim 
was a White, off-duty Emergency Medical Technician.128 The 
victim’s race and occupation likely motivated prosecutors to seek 
the indictment. In addition, there tends to be greater sympathy for 
victims suffering from a mental health crisis.129 Under these 
circumstances, even though Krook was also White, prosecutors 
went to the grand jury. They did not, however, go so far as to 
recommend a felony-murder charge. One can speculate as to 
whether prosecutors would have pursued felony-murder had the 
shooting involved an officer of color. Conversely, had the victim been 
a person of color, an indictment may not have been sought at all. 
What appear to be surface inroads towards justice in the Krook 
prosecution are nuanced and may actually be yet another 
manifestation of racial inequity. This is an inequity challenged—
but not eviscerated—by the conviction of Floyd’s killer. 
The Krook case stands in stark contrast to the most recent 
prosecuted police shooting in Minnesota leading up to George 
Floyd’s killing, but that does not mean that it harmonizes with the 
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Chauvin case when it comes to racial justice and policing. Mohamed 
Noor was a Black, Somali-American Minneapolis police officer who, 
in the dark of night, shot and killed a White woman.130 While 
initially Noor was charged with third-degree murder and second-
degree manslaughter,131 prosecutors later elevated charges, 
bypassing second-degree felony-murder to charge Noor with second-
degree intentional murder.132 Although bringing criminal charges—
perhaps even a felony-murder charge—was appropriate, 
intentional murder was a stretch.133 There was no body camera 
footage and no incriminating statement by Noor.134 His charges far 
exceeded those that Yanez and Krook faced. Noor’s was the only one 
of the three cases where an officer of color killed a White victim, so 
the charging and outcome of that case should not be whole-
heartedly celebrated. 
Just a few miles from the courthouse where Chauvin’s trial 
was still drawing to its conclusion, yet another young Black man 
was gunned down by a White peace officer, Kimberly Potter.135 
Daunte Wright had been pulled over for expired license plate tabs, 
allegedly tried to flee, and was shot because Potter somehow 
thought she was handling a taser instead of a firearm.136 A County 
Attorney promptly charged the officer with Second-Degree 
Manslaughter, and Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison 
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vowed to continue with the prosecution when his office took over.137 
Though it appears more a case of ineptitude than savagery, this 
case has many of the same racial, policing, and power elements of 
Chauvin’s. And the likely result is another conviction. That would 
be the right outcome; it would reinforce the sea change finally 
evident in Chauvin’s case. The hope is that these tragic cases will 
decrease in frequency, but when they do happen, the trend for 
greater accountability will continue. 
Against this backdrop it appears we are at a fulcrum in our 
long history of racial inequity in the prosecution and sentencing of 
police killings, and in the use of the felony-murder doctrine more 
generally. Up until now, most frequently, officers who killed were 
never even charged.138 On the rare occasions—two others in recent 
memory in Minnesota—that a White officer was charged or 
indicted, it was only to second-degree culpable manslaughter, not 
felony-murder.139 A person of color is killed by police; the initial 
public outcry dissipates; only in rare cases are charges brought; 
then it happens all over again. Community leaders like former 
Minneapolis NAACP president Leslie Redmond have expressed 
their exasperation: “The 13th [Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution] abolished slavery except if one was duly convicted of 
a crime. The legacy of slave patrols ha[s] continued through our 
current policing system and it is time for a change. The murder of 
George Floyd made people realize that silence equal[s] consent.”140 
Considering that long history of tribulation, the community 
rightly celebrated Chauvin’s convictions. But there is a reasonable 
chance that the conviction to the top count, second-degree felony-
murder, will not stand. The Supreme Court of Minnesota may 
answer the call of academics and practitioners to reevaluate the 
merger limitation to the felony-murder doctrine.141 The high Court 
may hold that at the very least assaults—and possibly other felony-
level crimes of physical aggression towards a person—that lead to 
an unintended death cannot predicate felony-murder. Such a 
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holding would be grounded in the following reasoning: because the 
mens rea, or violent underlying criminal intent was common to the 
predicate assaultive crime and murder in the abstract, the two 
crimes merge.142  
As horrific as his actions were, Chauvin did not intend to kill 
Floyd. There was public outrage when he was not charged with 
intentional murder,143 but Ellison and his team were correct to 
conclude that intentional murder simply did not fit. Chauvin set out 
to do something appalling: he likely wanted make Floyd fear the 
power imbalance, likely wanted to hurt Floyd; perhaps he even 
intended to make him beg for his life, or at the very least recognize 
that he had the absolute power to take it away. Chauvin likely 
further intended to whitewash all of this in a police report he would 
have turned over to prosecutors to entice them to charge Floyd, had 
he survived. He likely intended to make Floyd out as the bad actor, 
maybe even the aggressor, just as peace officers have done across 
the Twin Cities and across the rest of the country with impunity for 
far too long. Even more appalling, Chauvin used the power of his 
badge to try to do all of this. But none of this could be congruent 
with an affirmative intent to kill. The Author is among the harshest 
critics of what Chauvin did, but to assert that he intended to slowly 
kill George Floyd in broad daylight amidst a sea of onlookers is 
misguided. 
As unsettling as this prospect is, and as much as Derek 
Chauvin deserves a harsh penalty for the heinous murder he 
without question committed, the progressive elements of the legal 
community have to recognize that in many ways, Chauvin’s case 
provides a sound factual scenario to finally rewrite Minnesota’s 
felony-murder doctrine by adopting a merger limitation. Chauvin 
was calculated and intentional in perpetrating an appalling and 
wholly unjustified assault, but he did not intend to kill. Take away 
the badge, take away the devastation Chauvin’s actions have had 
on the community, take away his heartlessness, his violence, his 
callousness, and his horrifying belief that he was untouchable, and 
what is left is a text-book example of the type of prosecution that a 
merger limitation to the felony-murder doctrine would preclude. 
The law must be so clinical, so objective, and so dispassionate if it 
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is to dispense justice on a broad scale, even when it seems 
unpalatable in the short term. 
Change in Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine is long overdue. 
But from a community, racial equity, and police reform perspective, 
it would seem both shameful and tragic if this were to be the case 
to finally deliver it. For more than forty years, the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota and the State Legislature have turned a deaf ear to 
calls for reform,144 silencing those who have suffered from a racially 
and socioeconomically biased law weaponized against the 
disenfranchised.145 Shameful, tragic, but not atypical: the world 
finally listens when a White person of power speaks. 
Chauvin’s legal team will invariably do just that by 
challenging the felony-murder conviction with a call for merger. 
Ironically, the unintended champion for a long-overdue change in 
law that would benefit communities of color may now be this White 
former officer who has wreaked such devastation on those very 
communities. It is not just ironic; it is insulting and demeaning. 
However distasteful it may be, Chauvin’s appeal has the potential 
to finally cleanse Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine of some of the 
gross racial and socioeconomic inequity that has plagued it for 
generations. 
Peace officers are not the only actors who have perpetuated 
the inequities of Minnesota’s felony-murder doctrine; prosecutors 
and judges should not escape blame.146 As sickening as overturning 
the most serious conviction against Chauvin would be, the 
accompanying evolution in the law would facilitate justice, even if 
prosecutors and judges were not ready. The outcry, tragedy, and 
reform of the past year should leave their mark on these ministers 
of justice, awakening them to the inequities of the felony-murder 
doctrine and the way it has long been employed to defile 
communities of color. But even if all that has happened in the past 
year does not have that effect, a change in the law would drag 
prosecutors and judges forward, whether they were ready or not, 
because it would finally deprive them of a tool that—unconsciously 
or intentionally—they have long weaponized against the 
disenfranchised.147 
So even if Chauvin’s felony-murder conviction is overturned, 
George Floyd will still have had a lasting impact on the law and on 
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the broader community in which it is immersed. Slow as the waking 
of conscience may be, the tide is finally shifting. And that tidal pool 
is deeper, and hopefully longer lasting, than just Derek Chauvin’s 
legal case. Although only one of the recent Minnesota police killings 
leading up to Chauvin has resulted in a conviction, all four cases 
were brought in the past five years.148 On an unprecedented scale 
in the wake of George Floyd’s killing, the streets have flooded with 
sustained protest—both in Minnesota and around the world.149 
Their calls are for racial equity and police reform.150 And it has not 
been without effect: the public has successfully demanded laws 
aimed at fostering more effective relationships between the police 
and the community, preventing police killings, and imposing 
greater accountability when killings do occur.151 Moreover, leaders 
like Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo are now at the 
helm. He immediately discharged all four officers involved in 
Floyd’s death and promised, “The Floyd family will lead me 
forward.”152 Finally, the aggressive charging of Chauvin,153 like the 
general approach of Ellison and his team to this prosecution, are in 
and of themselves promising.154 Things are starting to change. 
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The Supreme Court of Minnesota may wrestle Chauvin’s 
murder convictions away from the communities that rightly 
celebrated them, but it cannot take away the reform, the unity, and 
the dialogue that has grown over the course of this past year. 
Moreover, when it comes to the felony-murder doctrine, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota cannot take away that conviction 
without also taking away a tool that has been weaponized in the 
legal system against communities of color for generations. The ideal 
outcome is for Chauvin’s appeal to catalyze a dialogue about a 
merger limitation to the felony-murder doctrine, but for the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota to recognize that public policy 
demands that his conviction stand. 
There is momentum behind this outcome. The appellate 
posture of the Noor case illustrates Minnesota appellate courts’ 
prism shift when it comes to killings by police generally. Although 
not specifically enumerated in statute, a time-honored common law 
requirement for Murder in the Third-Degree is that the killer’s 
“general malice” involve “ill will” directed at someone other than 
“the person slain.”155 The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Noor could 
not have been any more flagrant in disregarding the long line of 
binding precedent from the Supreme Court of Minnesota,156 instead 
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holding without ambiguity that “[t]he phrase does not preclude the 
possibility of a third-degree murder conviction if an unintentional 
death is caused by an act directed at a single person.”157 A bold 
stance this was for the Minnesota Court of Appeals, an error-
correcting court not authorized to forge new policy.158 The Noor 
appellate court made this ruling knowing that it would pave the 
way for reinstating the Murder in the Third-Degree charge on the 
eve of the Chauvin trial, which was already pending voir dire.159 
The intermediate appellate court’s legal reasoning was strained at 
best. In sum, the Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged in Noor 
the overwhelming weight of binding authority, then promptly 
issued a ruling in direct contradiction to it. This is result-oriented 
reasoning at its finest, and it demonstrates just how much the 
cultural climate has changed. 
It is significant that the Minnesota Court of Appeals was 
receptive to this change in cultural climate. Noor suggests that 
appellate courts will no longer be complacent in police abuse. As a 
matter of public policy, they will now instead side with those 
terrorized by it. On some level, this is a step in the right direction. 
However, it is legally nuanced. What is clear is that the holding in 
Noor seems to show the courts mirroring the growing public 
intolerance of police killings. Not even the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals is immune to the evolution George Floyd’s killing has 
propelled this past year. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota likely will not be immune to 
this evolution either. It will uphold both Noor, when it comes to 
Murder in the Third-Degree, and Chauvin when it comes to Felony-
Murder in the Second-Degree and Murder in the Third-Degree. It 
will uphold these convictions against former peace officers even 
though it requires making new law as it pertains to Murder in the 
Third-Degree, and upholding bad law, at least temporarily, as it 
pertains to Second-Degree Felony-Murder. To the extent that these 
laws implicate excessive force by police, that is probably a good 
thing. But the social dialogue and legal reform should not stop with 
the analysis of the five prosecuted Minnesota police killings in 
recent memory. 
 
955 N.W.2d at 645) (using a mere general cannon of construction to attempt to 
unwrite a well-established tenet of Murder in the Third Degree). The Noor court even 
quotes the 1896 murder statute, emphasizing the words “design to effect the death” 
to argue that somehow the plain language of the century-old statute invalidates the 
requirement that the defendant endanger another person. See 955 N.W.2d at 655. 
 157. Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 656.  
 158. Jensen v. 1985 Ferrari, 949 N.W.2d 729, 741 n.21 (Minn. Ct. App. 2020). 
 159. Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 644. 
2021] George Floyd’s Legacy 569 
If the high Court does not forge new ground by adopting the 
merger limitation in the Chauvin appeal, it should be vigilant not 
to overlook a more appropriate case to reform the felony-murder 
doctrine. Instead of protecting the White former peace officer who 
violently betrayed the public trust, the case that ultimately propels 
legal reform of the felony-murder doctrine should look more like 
most of the convictions that have come through the system in the 
last forty years. These cases have borne the mark of a tragedy, but 
for opposite reasons: most convictions feature disenfranchised 
people of color as defendants. They commit assaults, do not intend 
to kill, and cannot hide behind a badge. These actors, though 
certainly not blameless, have for years received the draconian 
treatment that Chauvin will seek to sidestep on appeal. 
The tragedy of George Floyd must not be compounded. Even if 
his case exposes some of the faults of the felony-murder doctrine, 
Chauvin does not deserve to be the agent of reform—not after what 
he has done to the community. The conversation must begin here, 
but the true reformer has yet to come forward. The time is ripe. We 
are reexamining police killings; now we must reexamine the 
weaponization of the felony-murder doctrine against 
disenfranchised people of color. 
Prosecutors have analyzed the Chauvin case through a 
different lens than past police killings. Hopefully, appellate court 
jurists do too. Finally deploying a second-degree felony-murder 
charge against a peace officer with success demonstrates this shift. 
It took strong evidence. It also took a jury that had absorbed the 
social evolution that has taken place in the year since George 
Floyd’s killing. 
The convictions will not repair the long-standing racial 
inequities of the felony-murder doctrine—or of criminal 
prosecutions more generally—nor will they completely halt the 
onslaught of police killings in the Twin Cities and in the rest of the 
nation and world. But they have already had some effect in making 
peace officers reevaluate use of force. And regardless of what 
happens in the appellate courts, the appeal will force a long-overdue 
conversation about substantive felony-murder reform in Minnesota, 
across the country, and hopefully in the few nations abroad that still 
employ the archaic doctrine. This conversation will embrace 
evolving norms about racial justice and policing. The convictions 
and appeal will make prosecutors and judges more cognizant of 
racial disparities that leave gaping wounds. They will reinforce 
broader reform, rethinking, and unity. They will promote, solidify, 
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and stand for justice both in our laws and in our communities. That 
will be George Floyd’s legacy. 
 
 
